North Carolina RICO: A Critical Analysis and User\u27s Guide by Thornton, Joseph Robert
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 66 | Number 2 Article 8
1-1-1988
North Carolina RICO: A Critical Analysis and
User's Guide
Joseph Robert Thornton
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joseph R. Thornton, North Carolina RICO: A Critical Analysis and User's Guide, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 445 (1988).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol66/iss2/8
North Carolina RICO: A Critical Analysis and User's Guide
Business had not been good for Henry Rockhart, grower and seller of gin-
seng.1 The buying public no longer seemed to believe ginseng's major selling
point, its power as an aphrodisiac, and sales had fallen off in recent years. When
Henry found that his neighbors, Sam and Sophie Sovski, had been stealing gin-
seng, Henry was ready to quit the business entirely.
The Sovskis had a problem too: Sam suffered from a certain failure in his
physical relationship with Sophie. This condition worried them to distraction
and made Sam willing to try nearly anything as a remedy, including ginseng.
They did not want to steal from Henry, but the Sovskis were not wealthy, al-
ready having spent all of their savings on Sam's fresh oyster diet. Also, Sam
thought Henry's price of twenty dollars per ounce was high for ginseng, espe-
cially because Henry had not sold much of it lately. Given the acres of ginseng
Henry had growing behind his house, Sam believed Henry would never miss
any. So every Sunday in the spring and summer of 1987, while Henry was at
church, Sam and Sophie would drive to the field in their Chevette, hop over the
fence, and dig up a few roots. They would then drive home, chop the root, and
cure it in their oven. Sam drank a lot of ginseng tea in those months, but usually
had some left over to sell to his brother Stan, who suffered from a similar
affliction.
Unknown to either the Sovskis or Henry, agents of the State Bureau of
Investigation's Special Task Force on Ginseng Larceny (STFGL) had staked out
Henry's farm since March and had videotaped the periodic thefts. In August
1987, at the end of the ginseng growing season, the agents raided the Sovski
home, arrested Sam and Sophie, and confiscated their Chevette, Magic Chef gas
oven, tea pot and mugs, three kitchen knives, and a quantity of small filter bags
containing a substance that analysis later showed to be ginseng. The agents also
informed Henry of his loss.
Sam and Sophie were charged under North Carolina General Statutes sec-
tion 14-79 for larceny of ginseng, a felony. A new assistant attorney general,
Peter Powers, prosecuted them. The Sovskis pleaded guilty to seven counts of
larceny of ginseng but the judge, sympathetic to Sam's disability, fined them
costs of fifty dollars and placed Sam and Sophie on probation for six months.
Not satisfied that they had paid their debt to society, Peter Powers brought
a civil action against the Sovskis under North Carolina's Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).2 Powers sought forfeiture of the con-
fiscated items as well as other equitable relief. Because the Sovskis' felony con-
victions established a per se violation of RICO, 3 the court ordered a judicial sale
1. The fictional characters and agencies in this introduction were created to illustrate the use
and potential abuse of North Carolina's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO). N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75D-1 to -14 (Interim Supp. 1986).
2. Id.
3. See id. § 75D-8(f).
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of the oven and kitchen implements4 and retention of the Chevette by the
STFGL for its operations.5 The court also prohibited Sam and Sophie from ever
entering Henry's land.
6
On the day of Sam's conviction a lawyer named Steve Sleaze approached
Henry and told him about RICO's private action provisions. 7 A week later
Sleaze filed a RICO suit against the Sovskis on Henry's behalf. Henry's com-
plaint alleged an injury to his business from the lost ginseng roots. Henry's
complaint stated that because Sam stole three plants every Sunday for six
months, and one plant produces an average of ten ounces, he lost an amount of
ginseng worth $14,400. The complaint sought damages of $14,400, trebled to
$43,200, plus reasonable attorney's fees.8 Using the Sovskis' convictions as col-
lateral estoppel,9 Sleaze handily won the case. Henry collected only $3000, how-
ever, before Sam and Sophie filed for bankruptcy.
Although the North Carolina General Assembly probably did not intend
RICO to be used in a case like the Sovskis', what happened to them is possible
under the statute. As their experience illustrates, RICO provides a civil cause of
action to the State against organized criminals. RICO also allows actions by
private plaintiffs injured in their businesses by such criminals. The first part of
this Note highlights RICO's more important sections and how the new law
works-a user's guide. Sam and Sophie's case also demonstrates several of
RICO's problems, such as its broad scope and potential for abuse. The second
part of the Note examines these and other problems-a critical analysis. The
Note concludes that parts of RICO, such as the State's civil forfeiture section,
are unconstitutional. Other parts, such as the provision for private treble dam-
ages, will make RICO unworkable in practice. Finally, the Note recommends
specific curative amendments to RICO that would make it both constitutionally
and practically correct.
In 1986 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted RICO to deal with
the problem of organized crime in the State.' 0 The statute begins with a state-
ment of the general assembly's findings and intent. The general assembly found
that organized crime is a problem in North Carolina, especially when such crime
infiltrates the State's legitimate businesses." Accordingly, the general assembly
4. See id. § 75D-5fj)(5).
5. See id. § 75D-5(j)(2).
6. See id. § 75D-8(a)(2).
7. See id. § 75D-8(c).
8. See id.
9. See id. § 75D-8(e).
10. Act of July 12, 1986, ch. 999, § 1, 1986 N.C. Sess. Laws 360, 361 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 75D-1 to -14 (Interim Supp. 1986)).
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-2(a) (Interim Supp. 1986). The general assembly wrote:
The General Assembly finds that a severe problem is posed in this State by the increasing
organization among certain unlawful elements and the increasing extent to which organ-
ized unlawful activities and funds acquired as a result of organized unlawful activity are
being directed to and against the legitimate economy of the State.
Id. Although the general assembly did not define "directed to and against the legitimate economy,"
it likely meant, for example, the use of illicitly gained money to buy into legitimate businesses for
"laundering" purposes or the extortion of "protection" money from legitimate businesses.
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intended that RICO be used (1) to deter organized crime; (2) to prevent unjust
enrichment of organized unlawful elements; (3) to restore the proceeds acquired
by such elements to the general economy of the State; and (4) to compensate
victims of organized unlawful activity.1 2 Further, the general assembly made
clear that RICO is to be directed only against "interrelated [patterns] of organ-
ized unlawful activity, the purpose or effect of which is to derive pecuniary
gain," 1 3 not against "isolated and unrelated incidents of unlawful conduct."
1 4
Finally, "legitimate business organizations" lacking any connection to organ-
ized criminals should not be subject to RICO actions. 15
Following the statement of intent, section 75D-4 of RICO prohibits certain
activities. Subsection (a) provides that no person shall:
(1) engage in a pattern of racketeering activity or, through a pattern of
racketeering activities ... acquire or maintain ... any interest in or
control of any enterprise [or property]; or (2) conduct or participate in,
directly or indirectly, any enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity.., or (3) conspire with another or attempt to violate any of
[these] provisions.1
6
Violations, however, constitute not crimes but civil offenses; "therefore a mens
rea or criminal intent is not an essential element of any of [these] civil
offenses."'
17
To clarify the meaning of section 75D-4, the general assembly defined sev-
eral terms. "Racketeering activity" is committing or attempting to commit cer-
tain acts that would be indictable crimes' 8 if accompanied by the requisite
criminal intent.' 9 These acts are defined by reference to existing offenses, such
as statutes prohibiting the sale, use, or possession of controlled substances.20 The
scope of "racketeering activity" is quite broad, including nearly all of North
Carolina's felony offenses,2 ' with the exception of a few specific articles and sec-
12. Id. § 75D-2(b).
13. Id. § 75D-2(c).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. § 75D-4(a).
17. Id. § 75D-4(b).
18. The North Carolina General Statutes provide that a bill of indictment is proper only for
offenses within the original jurisdiction of the superior court. Id. § 15A-627(b) (1983). "The supe-
rior court has exclusive, original jurisdiction over all criminal actions not assigned to the district
court division ...." Id. § 7A-271 (1986). The district court has jurisdiction over nonfelony of-
fenses. Id. § 7A-272. Therefore, the superior court has jurisdiction over felonies, with some limited
exceptions. See id. §§ 7A-270 to -271; State v. Wall, 271 N.C. 675, 157 S.E.2d 363 (1967). In
general, then, indictable offenses are limited to felonies. Felonies are crimes punishable by death or
imprisonment in the State's prison, crimes denominated as felonies by statute, or crimes that were
felonies at common law. All other crimes are misdemeanors. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-1 (1986).
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15D-3(c)(1) (Interim Supp. 1986).
20. RICO defines racketeering activity in part by reference to "Article 5 of Chapter 90 of the
General Statutes of North Carolina relating to controlled substances and counterfeit controlled sub-
stances." Id. § 75D-3(c)(1)a.
21. See supra note 18. Certain misdemeanor statutes, however, state that they are indictable
offenses. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-114 (1986). It is unclear whether these misdemeanors are
within RICO's scope. For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 148-53 and accompanying
text.
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tions.22 Unfortunately for Sam, his theft of the ginseng is one of the included
crimes. The general assembly also incorporated into such acts the Federal
RICO definitions of racketeering activities. 23 The federal definition of racketeer-
ing activity has been summarized by the United States Supreme Court:
any act "chargeable" under several generically described state criminal
laws, any act "indictable" under numerous specific federal criminal
provisions,... and any "offense" involving bankruptcy or securities
fraud or drug-related activities that is "punishable" under federal
law.
24
A "pattern of racketeering activity" means committing two or more such
racketeering acts that have similar purposes, results, accomplices, or victims, or
that are otherwise interrelated. 25 One of the acts must occur after October 1,
1986, the effective date of RICO, 26 and one other must have occurred within the
four preceding years.27 Sam's repeated commission of racketeering activities in
the spring and summer of 1987 established a RICO "pattern." Furthermore, his
conviction on separate counts established a per se violation for the purposes of a
State forfeiture action. Section 75D-8(f) provides that defendants convicted of
criminal offenses that are "racketeering activities" over such a period as to estab-
lish a RICO "pattern" violate RICO per se.
28
A RICO violation results in two or more causes of action, one available to
the State29 and the others available to "[a]ny innocent person who is injured or
damaged in his business or property by reason of any violation of [RICO ].,,3o
The State claim proceeds through the Attorney General, who institutes an ac-
tion under section 75D-5, the RICO civil forfeiture proceeding.3 1 Under this
section "[a]ll property of every kind used or intended for use in the course of,
derived from, or realized through a racketeering activity ... is subject to forfei-
ture to the State."' 32 As with other civil actions, RICO forfeiture is governed by
the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.
33
In a RICO forfeiture action, property subject to such a suit may be seized
22. Racketeering activity is defined by reference to all of North Carolina's criminal statutes
under chapter 14 except articles 9, 22A, 38, 40, 43, 46, 47, and 59, and §§ 14-78.1, -82, -86, -145,
-146, -147, -177, -178, -179, -183, -184, -186, -190.9, -195, -197, -201, -202, -247, -248, and -313.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-3(c)(1)b (Interim Supp. 1986).
23. Id. § 75D-3(c)(2).
24. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1985) (citation omitted).
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-3(b) (Interim Supp. 1986).
26. Id.; Act of July 12, 1986, ch. 999, § 3, 1986 N.C. Sess. Laws 360, 372 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 75D-1 to -14 (Interim Supp. 1986)).
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-3(b) (Interim Supp. 1986). In computing the time separating rack-
eteering activities, periods of imprisonment should be excluded from the four years. Id.
28. Id. § 75D-8(f). This subsection only applies to RICO actions commenced by the State. 1d.
29. Id. § 75D-8(b).
30. Id. § 75D-8(c).
31. Id. § 75D-8(b). "Attorney General" means the Attorney General of North Carolina. Id.
§ 75D-3(f). The title may also include employees of the North Carolina Department of Justice and
district attorneys of North Carolina. Id.
32. Id. § 75D-5(a).
33. Id. § 75D-5(b); see id. § 1A-1 (1983). In addition, RICO forfeiture actions may be in rem
or in personam. Id. §§ 75D-5(c), (k).
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before the action is commenced. Moreover, the owner need not be convicted
criminally before a final forfeiture judgment is rendered.34 A criminal convic-
tion, however, makes the State's case easier because the defendant is estopped
from relitigating issues proved in the criminal trial.35 If convicted of two or
more such crimes within a four-year period, the defendant is deemed per se to
have violated RICO.3 6 Should seizure take place prior to the filing of the com-
plaint, however, it must be effected by a law enforcement officer incident to a
lawful arrest, search, or inspection. Further, the officer must have probable
cause to believe the property is subject to forfeiture and will be lost if not
seized.
37
When the State files its suit before seizure, the complaint must: (1) specify
the property sought to be forfeited; (2) state that the property sought is within
the court's jurisdiction; (3) give the grounds for forfeiture; and (4) name all per-
sons known to have an interest in the property. At this point the court must
make two ex parte determinations. First, the court must decide whether reason-
able grounds exist to believe the property is subject to forfeiture. The second
determination is whether notice to intended persons would cause the loss or
destruction of the property. 38 If the court finds reasonable grounds lacking, it
must dismiss the suit.39 If reasonable grounds exist, but notice would not cause
loss of the property, the court must order notice to interested persons prior to a
further hearing on the seizure.4° If the court finds both that reasonable grounds
exist and that notice would cause such a loss, it may order seizure of the prop-
erty without notice or further hearing.
4 1
After the property is seized and the complaint filed, every known interested
person who has not yet been served must be served a notice of seizure and a copy
of the complaint.42 Any interested person may join the action prior to judg-
ment. Such a person need not be named in the State's complaint.4 3 Pending
final judgment, the court may dispose of the property in any way necessary to
protect the property, so long as the court also protects the interests of innocent
parties.44 The statute makes clear that the interests of innocent parties are not
to be forfeited. Thus, if Sam's brother owned the Chevette and he was an inno-
cent party, the car could not be forfeited. To qualify as an innocent party, the
brother must not have had "actual or constructive knowledge that the property
34. Id. § 75D-5(d). Although the statute is silent on this point, the State's burden of proof is
probably a preponderance of the evidence, because RICO forfeiture is a civil action.
35. Id. § 75D-8(e).
36. Id. § 75D-8(f).
37. Id. § 75D-5(f). The Attorney General must then file a complaint within 31 days. Id.
38. Id. § 75D-S(e).
39. Id. § 75D-5(e)(1). The statute is silent as to what constitutes "reasonable grounds." See id.
40. Id. § 75D-5(e)(2).
41. Id. § 75D-5(e)(3).
42. Id. § 75D-5(g). Service should be in the manner prescribed by the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure, though the court may order service by publication within 30 days of the complaint's
filing. Id.
43. Id. § 75D-5(h)(1).
44. Id. § 75D-5(h)(3).
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was subject to forfeiture."'45 Further, if a creditor of Sam held a security interest
in the Chevette, and Sam was in default on the related debt, the court could
order the creditor to sell the car to satisfy the lien, with any excess to be paid
back into the court.
46
Once the court reaches a judgment of forfeiture,47 it has broad discretion in
disposing of the property.48 If its possession or use is illegal, the court may
order the property destroyed. 49 The court also may allow the State to retain the
property for official use.50 For example, in Sam's case the STFGL agents re-
ceived the Chevette. If no state agency wanted the car, the court could order its
judicial sale.51 Further, the Attorney General may sue defendants who have
notice of a RICO suit and who sell the property before it is seized.52 Had Sam
sold the car while having notice of the RICO action, he would be liable for its
fair market value.
In addition to forfeiture, the court may order several equitable remedies as
part of its final judgment.53 One such remedy is "[i]mposing reasonable restric-
tions upon the future activities ... of any defendant in the same or similar type
of endeavor [as originally violated RICO]. ' '54 For example, the court could en-
join Sam and Sophie from entering Henry's ginseng fields. When the violation
involves an enterprise55 such as a corporation or partnership, the court could
order the enterprise dissolved 56 or the divestiture of a defendant's interest in it. 7
Moreover, the court may order "[a]ny other equitable remedy appropriate to
effect complete forfeiture.., or to prevent future violations."58
As part of the State's enforcement, RICO includes an important procedural
section. Section 75D-11 authorizes the North Carolina Attorney General to
enter into "reciprocal agreements" with the Attorney General of the United
States or attorneys general from other states that have similar RICO statutes.59
Although the statute does not define "reciprocal agreements," it likely entails
coordination between law enforcement agencies and sharing of proceeds from
RICO actions involving interstate violators. 60
45. Id. § 75D-5(i).
46. Id. § 75D-5(h)(2).
47. The nature of the property (realty, personalty, or beneficial interest) determines when the
title will vest in the State. See id. § 75D-5(l)(1).
48. The court's discretion is limited only by the interests of substantial justice and innocent
parties. See id. § 75D-50)(7).
49. Id. § 75D-5(j)(1).
50. Id. § 75D-5(j)(2).
51. Id. § 75D-5(j)(5).
52. Id. § 75D-5(l)(2).
53. Id. § 75D-8(a).
54. Id. § 75D-8(a)(2).
55. Under RICO, "enterprise" is defined as any person, proprietorship, partnership, corpora-
tion, business trust, chartered union, governmental entity, association, or group of individuals associ-
ated in fact. Enterprise includes licit and illicit entities. Id. § 75D-3(a).
56. Id. § 75D-8(a)(3).
57. Id. § 75D-8(a)(I).
58. Id. § 751-8(a)(7).
59. Id. § 75D-11.
60. See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
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In addition to the State's action, RICO provides a private cause of action
for "[a]ny innocent person who is injured or damaged in his business or property
by reason of ... a pattern of racketeering activity."' 61 RICO, however, places
limits on the private right of action. First, at least one of the racketeering acts
complained of in the suit must not be mail or securities fraud.62 Second, a plain-
tiff must notify the North Carolina Attorney General of the private suit. The
Attorney General may seek a stay of the private action if it will interfere with an
ongoing public forfeiture suit.
63
In spite of these limitations, a private plaintiff has several incentives to
bring an action. First, the plaintiff's claim to forfeited property is superior to
the State's interest.64 To enforce the claim, the private plaintiff need only inter-
vene in the forfeiture proceeding before final judgment.65 Second, a prior con-
viction of a crime considered a racketeering activity estops the defendant from
raising matters settled in the trial.66 In Sam's case, for example, Henry's private
RICO suit primarily presented an issue of damages; Sam's criminal conviction
established the RICO violation. These two advantages and the potential for
treble damages 67 make RICO particularly attractive to private plaintiffs.
The foregoing user's guide is intended to be a quick and simple reference to
RICO as it is currently written. Although the statute seems straightforward on
its face, RICO's language and use raise several constitutional and pragmatic is-
sues. The first constitutional issue is whether RICO's forfeiture action is in es-
sence a civil or criminal statute. The United States Supreme Court noted the
importance of distinguishing between criminal and civil actions in United States
v. Ward.68 The Court wrote:
The distinction between a civil penalty and a criminal penalty is of
some constitutional import. The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, for example, is expressly limited to "any criminal case."
Similarly, the protections provided by the Sixth Amendment are avail-
able only in "criminal prosecutions." Other constitutional protections,
while not explicitly limited to one context or the other, have been so
limited by decision of this Court.
6 9
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-8(c) (Interim Supp. 1986).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. § 75D-8(d).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 75D-8(e). "A final conviction in any criminal proceeding for a violation of those laws
(defined as racketeering activities], shall estop the defendant in any subsequent civil action or pro-
ceeding under this Chapter as to all matters proved in the criminal proceeding." Id.
67. Id. § 75D-8(c). A private plaintiff "shall have a cause of action for three times the actual
damages sustained and reasonable attorneys fees." Id.
68. 448 U.S. 242 (1980). Ward involved an oil spill from a drilling facility leased by plaintiff.
When plaintiff notified authorities of the spill as required by § 31 1(b)(5) of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, he was assessed a $500 "civil" penalty as provided for in § 31 1(b)(6) of the Act.
Ward sought injunctive relief against the enforcement of the penalty and reporting requirement, and
argued that because the penalty was in essence "criminal," the reporting requirement violated his
right against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment. Id. at 244-47.
69. Id. at 248. Another such limited constitutional protection is the double jeopardy clause of
the fifth amendment. Id. (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938)). Furthermore, the
1988]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court in Ward held that the question of whether a penalty is crim-
inal or civil is a matter of statutory construction. 70 The Court set out a two-step
test for such a statutory analysis. The first step is whether the legislature indi-
cated, either expressly or impliedly, a preference for one label or the other.7 1
This inquiry focuses on the intent of the legislature; a punitive intent indicates
the law in question is a criminal proceeding.72 If the legislature's indicated in-
tention is to establish a civil penalty, a court reaches the second step: "whether
the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the]
intention."' 73 This second inquiry involves a balancing of governmental and
individual interests. 74 The court should recognize that a particularly burden-
some penalty may require that a defendant be accorded some or all of the consti-
tutional safeguards associated with criminal prosecutions. 75 For this second
part of the test, however, "only the clearest proof could suffice to establish the
unconstitutionality of a statute on such a ground. '" 76 Under this standard, a
court should find an action to be criminal only if the penalty is so severe as to
clearly belie the legislature's expressed intention.
Applying the first part of the Ward test to North Carolina's RICO forfei-
ture action, the statute at first seems to be civil in nature. The general assembly
expressed an intent that violation of RICO "is inequitable and constitutes a civil
offense only and is not a crime." 77 The implied intent, however, is also relevant.
In Trop v. Dulles,78 a case involving statutory forfeiture of citizenship, the
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Warren, wrote:
In deciding whether or not a law is penal, this Court has generally
based its determination upon the purpose of the statute. If the statute
imposes a disability for the purposes of punishment-that is, to repri-
mand the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc.-it has been considered pe-
nal. But a statute has been considered nonpenal if it imposes a
disability, not to punish, but to accomplish some other legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose.
79
In its statement of findings and intent, the general assembly directed RICO at
"organized unlawful elements." 8 0 Furthermore, the general assembly stated
burden of proof differs between a civil and criminal case. The Court requires proof beyond a reason-
able doubt only in criminal cases. Id. (citing United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 47-48 (1914)),
70. Id. (citing One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972)).
71. Id. (citing One Lot Emerald Cut Stone, 409 U.S. at 236-37).
72. Note, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for
"Criminal Activity, " 124 U. PA. L. REv. 192, 209 (1975).
73. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49 (citing Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617-21 (1960)).
74. Note, supra note 72, at 209.
75. Note, supra note 72, at 209.
76. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (quoted in Ward, 448 U.S. at 249).
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-4(b) (Interim Supp. 1986).
78. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Trop involved a statute that mandated the automatic forfeiture of a
defendant's citizenship on conviction, by court-martial, of wartime desertion. Defendant attacked
the statute on the grounds it constituted cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the eighth
amendment. The government argued that the statute was technically regulatory, not penal. The
Court held for defendant. Id.
79. Id. at 96 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-2(c) (Interim Supp. 1986).
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that its "purpose and intent" was to deter organized crime and to prevent unjust
enrichment of such criminals.81 The general assembly's call for deterrence im-
plies that its true purpose was penal.
82
Moreover, members of the general assembly have made public remarks in-
dicating that RICO was intended to be a criminal statute. Speaking on deterring
organized criminals, Representative Dennis A. Wicker stated: "They serve their
time, and they have that profit and that gain to enjoy." 83 Representative H.M.
Michaux stated: "They feel it is worth their time in prison to come out and enjoy
the fruits of their crimes."' 84 In supporting the RICO legislation, Attorney Gen-
eral Lacy Thornburg echoed the deterrence theme: "If we're going to give any
real meaning to the idea that crime doesn't pay, then you have to take strong
steps to take the profit out of crime."'85 It is clear from the statutory statement
of intent and statements by individual general assembly members that the RICO
statute is criminal in nature. The clause purporting to declare a RICO violation
a civil offense is merely a subterfuge for the general assembly's true intention.
The subterfuge results in part from the general assembly's desire to avoid the
constitutional protections of a criminal proceeding.8 6 Statements made by At-
torney General Thornburg imply that the civil action was preferred because of
its lower burden of proof.
8 7
Even if the legislative intent indicates RICO is a civil statute under the
Ward test, it still must undergo the second inquiry: whether on balance the
government's interests outweigh those of the individual. The Ward Court cited
a prior Supreme Court decision, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,8 8 as setting
forth several standards by which to balance governmental and individual inter-
ests. 89 The Mendoza-Martinez standards are:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deter-
rence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may be rationally con-
nected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation
81. Id. § 75D-2(b).
82. As the Supreme Court noted in Trop, deterrence is one of the purposes of criminal punish-
ment. 356 U.S. at 96. That deterrence is one of RICO's purposes indicates that the general assembly
intended state forfeiture to be a criminal proceeding.
83. Raleigh News and Observer, May 3, 1985, at 18A, col. 1.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. The other part of the subterfuge involves an attempt by the general assembly to avoid a
constitutional mandate that proceeds from criminal forfeitures go to local educational funding. If
RICO is held to be a civil action, however, the courts will have broad discretion in disposing of the
proceeds. See infra notes 107-17 and accompanying text.
87. Raleigh News and Observer, May 3, 1985, at 18A, col. 1. The News and Observer re-
ported: "The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act would provide a civil path to
recovering property bought with profits from crime. Thornburg said that would be easier than crim-
inal action because the burden of proof was not as strict in civil action." Id. at 18A, col. 1-2.
88. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
89. Ward, 448 U.S. at 247-48 n.7.
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to the alternative purpose assigned.90
Applying these considerations to North Carolina's RICO forfeiture action, the
balance falls in favor of the individual. RICO's main purpose is to deter organ-
ized criminal activity. 9 1 Under RICO, "racketeering activity" is defined by ref-
erence to North Carolina's criminal statutes.92 Thus, the behavior to which
RICO forfeiture applies is already criminal. The sole difference between crimi-
nal statutes and RICO is that racketeering activity does not require the mens rea
or criminal intent necessary for a crime. 93 Moreover, forfeiture is an affirmative
disability, unlike, for example, the divestiture of a person's interest in an enter-
prise, which should result in no loss to the defendant. 94
In finding RICO forfeiture a criminal proceeding, the most convincing of
the Mendoza-Martinez factors is that forfeiture historically has been a criminal
penalty, even when disguised by a civil label.95 The best example of forfeiture in
a criminal proceeding is Federal RICO, which clearly sets out forfeiture as a
criminal penalty. 96 It is contradictory for the forfeiture penalty for the same
offense to be criminal at the federal level but civil in North Carolina.97 Why
should a RICO defendant be accorded fewer federal constitutional protections
simply because North Carolina rather than the federal government brings a for-
feiture suit?
Moreover, the common law accords with the concept of forfeiture as a
criminal penalty. In United States v. United States Coin & Currency98 the gov-
ernment sued defendant for forfeiture of gambling money in addition to arrest-
90. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted). In striking the balance, how-
ever, not all the Mendoza-Martinez factors need point in one direction. Id. at 169.
91. See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-3(c) (Interim Supp. 1986). Other United States Supreme Court
decisions, however, seem to indicate that this factor alone will not establish a statute as criminal.
The Court has written that because "the offending conduct is described by reference to criminal
statutes does not mean that its occurrence must be established by criminal standards or that the
consequences of a finding of liability in a private civil action are identical to the consequences of a
criminal conviction." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985). Further, in Ward
the Court wrote: "We have noted on a number of occasions that 'Congress may impose both a
criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission.'" Ward, 448 U.S. at 250 (quot-
ing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938)).
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-3(c) (Interim Supp. 1986). Therefore, the Mendoza.Martinez con-
dition of whether scienter is necessary to bring about forfeiture is not met. Even though scienter and
criminal intent are not the same, RICO requires neither in a forfeiture proceeding. See id. § 75D-
4(b).
94. Divestiture, another RICO remedy under § 75D-8(a)(l), theoretically involves no loss to
the defendant; he is compensated for the value of the interest sold. In practice, of course, a forced
sale may result in a return of less than fair market value. See Note, Enforcing Criminal Laws
Through Civil Proceedings: Section 1964 of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964 (1970), 53 Tax. L. REv. 1055, 1060 (1975).
95. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718 (1971); One 1958 Plym-
outh Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700-01 (1965); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634
(1886).
96. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (Supp. IV 1986).
97. Both the North Carolina General Assembly and the United States Congress prescribe for-
feiture for violations of the respective RICO provisions. Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-5 (Interim
Supp. 1986). Further, North Carolina incorporates in its entirety the federal definition of "racke-
teering activity." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-3(c)(2) (Supp. 1986); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l) (In-
terim Supp. III 1985) (federal definition of "racketeering activity").
98. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
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ing him for failure to register as a gambler and pay taxes on his profits. The
Supreme Court reasoned:
From the relevant constitutional standpoint there is no difference be-
tween a man who "forfeits" $8,674 [the amount in issue] because he
has used the money in illegal gambling activities and a man who pays a
"criminal fine" of $8,674 as a result of the same course of conduct. In
both instances, money liability is predicated upon a finding of the
owner's wrongful conduct; in both cases, the Fifth Amendment applies
with equal force. 99
In an earlier case, One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,100 the
Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion. In Plymouth Sedan law enforce-
ment officers illegally searched an automobile without a warrant and found
thirty-one cases of untaxed liquor. Because of the exclusionary rule the State
could not use evidence of the liquor in a criminal trial and instead sought civil
forfeiture of the car.10 1 The trial court dismissed on the ground that forfeiture
depended on the admission of the illegally obtained evidence. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reversed, however, reasoning that the fourth amendment applies
only to criminal proceedings and that forfeiture is a civil action.10 2 The United
States Supreme Court disagreed with the Pennsylvania court's ruling and held
that forfeiture is "quasi-criminal in character."10 3 The Supreme Court reasoned
that if defendant were convicted, he would have been subject to a maximum fine
of five hundred dollars. In the forfeiture proceeding defendant was subject to
losing his car, valued at one thousand dollars. Given that defendant would lose
more in forfeiture than in a criminal conviction, it would be "anomalous" to
hold that illegally seized evidence is admissible in a forfeiture proceeding, but
not in a criminal prosecution. 1° 4
The Court's reasoning in Plymouth Sedan applies to North Carolina RICO.
The Sovskis, for example, were fined only fifty dollars and placed on probation
at trial when they were accorded all the constitutional safeguards available in a
criminal proceeding. 10 5 Yet, in the State's forfeiture suit, Sam and Sophie lost
their car and other items but enjoyed none of these protections. Such a result
was absurd in Plymouth Sedan and would be equally absurd under North Caro-
lina RICO forfeiture. Because forfeiture historically has been held to be a crimi-
nal penalty and the common-law rationales apply as well to RICO, the balance
of the Ward test comes down on the side of RICO forfeiture being a criminal
proceeding. 106
99. Id. at 718.
100. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
101. Id. at 694-95.
102. Id. at 695.
103. Id. at 700.
104. Id. at 701.
105. As Class I felons, of course, the Sovskis could have received five-year sentences. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-1.1(a)(9) (Interim Supp. 1986). Although an active sentence is arguably "worse" treat-
ment than forfeiture, both smack of punishment and it seems difficult and arbitrary to draw a consti-
tutional distinction between them.
106. A collateral issue is which of the constitutional protections should be accorded a RICO
forfeiture defendant. If the forfeiture statute is found criminal under the Ward intent inquiry, the
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In addition to federal constitutional concerns, the North Carolina Constitu-
tion provides another dimension to the issue of whether RICO is a civil or crimi-
nal statute. As RICO is written, forfeited property or its proceeds go first to
interested innocent parties, with any excess going to the State's agencies or the
State Treasurer. 107 Article IX, section 7 of the North Carolina Constitution,
however, provides:
All moneys, stocks, bonds, and other property belonging to a county
school fund, and the clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures and
of all fines collected in the several counties for any breach of the penal
laws of the State, shall belong to and remain in the several counties,
and shall be faithfully appropriated and used exclusively for maintain-
ing free public schools.'
0 8
The key to the constitutional provision is the wordpenal. If RICO is criminal in
nature, forfeitures must go to public education.
Regardless of the constitutional mandate, the general assembly specifically
intended that RICO forfeiture proceeds not go to schools. Representative Den-
nis Wicker stated that RICO proceeds should be used for law enforcement and
interstate cooperation, not education.' 0 9 The general assembly's intent is rea-
sonable; it is clear that more money is needed for law enforcement. State Bureau
of Investigation Director Robert Morgan stated that earmarking RICO forfeit-
ures for law enforcement is critical for certain operations:
Buy money for drugs is important right now .... In the days of
moonshine investigations, the sheriff would go out and buy a little li-
quor, arrest the guy right then and get his money back.
But if you do that with drugs, you only end up with the little guy,
not the big distributors .... And with cocaine costing about $3,000 an
ounce, we may put out $40,000 before we even make an arrest. 110
In addition, letting all proceeds go to education would discourage federal
agencies and other states from helping North Carolina with interstate investiga-
tions."1'1 RICO authorizes the Attorney General to enter into reciprocal agree-
Supreme Court has held that all safeguards apply. E.g., Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 167 ("[Ihe
Fifth and Sixth Amendments mandate that this punishment [forfeiture of citizenship] cannot be
imposed without a prior criminal trial and all its incidents, including indictment, notice, confronta-
tion, jury trial, assistance of counsel, and compulsory process for obtaining witnesses."). Under a
balancing of the interests, however, RICO could be deemed only "quasi-criminal" and a RICO
forfeiture defendant would be entitled to some, but not all, of the constitutional protections. See,
eg., United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. at 722 ("the Fifth Amendment's privilege may prop-
erly be invoked in these [forfeiture] proceedings"); Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 702 ("exclusionary
rule is applicable to forfeiture proceedings"); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886) ("for-
feitures incurred by the commission of offenses against the law, are of this quasi-criminal nature").
Although the extent of protection in a quasi-criminal proceeding is unclear, a defendant in such an
action should be accorded the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, United States
Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. at 722, and the fourth amendment prohibition of unlawful searches and
seizures, Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 702.
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-5(j) (Interim Supp. 1986).
108. N.C. CONsr. art. IX, § 7.
109. Durham Morning Herald, July 6, 1985, at 6A, col. 1.
110. Id.
111. Id. Representative Wicker, who made this point, left unclear why other states would be
discouraged. Wicker's reasoning is probably that other states would not want to help North Caro-
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ments with other states that have similar RICO laws and with the federal
government. 112 Under RICO, North Carolina could join twenty-one other such
states and thereby become eligible to share in the forfeited proceeds from inter-
state crime. 13 The proceeds in question would be substantial. Senator Winner
stated that "[t]here's no way to know how much money could be raised by this,
but... it could raise several million dollars a year for the general fund."
' 14
The general assembly, moreover, was aware of the school fund problem.
Senator Robert Warren, for example, argued that RICO clashed with article
IX, section 7 of the state constitution.1 15 Furthermore, the Senate Judiciary IV
Committee, which sent RICO to the floor, was unable to resolve the question
and instead opted to leave it to the courts. 116 This reservation concerning
RICO's constitutionality, however, did not prevent both houses from passing the
law unanimously.' 
1 7
In resolving the school fund problem, the courts and the general assembly
will have two options, although each has problems associated with it. 118 The
first option is to argue that under article IX, section 7, the State at least can
recover its costs in bringing about the forfeiture. The North Carolina Constitu-
tion only mandates that "clear proceeds" of the penalty go to education.1 19 In
Hightower v. Thompson 120 the North Carolina Supreme Court defined "clear
proceeds" as "the amount of the forfeit less the cost of collection."' 12 1 In a
more recent case, Cauble v. City of Asheville, 122 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals articulated the rule for calculating clear proceeds:
[T]he test for determining permissible deductions from gross monies
lina if they were unable to share in North Carolina's forfeiture proceeds. If RICO forfeiture is
declared criminal, it is likely that those states could not have a share of North Carolina forfeiture
proceeds. See State v. Maultsby, 139 N.C. 583, 51 S.E. 956 (1905). In Maultsby the North Carolina
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a statute that authorized a fine but provided half the pen-
alty be paid to an informant. The court reasoned that fines cannot include informant payments,
because a fine's clear proceeds must go to the school fund and "clear proceeds" means the total sum
less only collection fees. Id. at 585, 51 S.E. at 956. If other states' law enforcement agencies may be
analogized to informants, North Carolina's constitution would also prohibit sharing forfeiture pro-
ceeds with the other states.
112. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-11 (Interim Supp. 1986).
113. Raleigh News and Observer, May 3, 1985, at 18A, col. 1. Exactly how proceeds would be
shared among states is unclear.
114. Raleigh News and Observer, July 12, 1986, at 5C, col. 2.
115. Id. For the text of art. IX, § 7, see supra text accompanying note 108.
116. Raleigh News and Observer, May 3, 1985, at 5C, col. 2.
117. Id.
118. An additional option is to argue that RICO forfeiture is not penal and thus not subject to
article IX, section seven. As discussed above, however, the forfeiture action is almost certainly a
criminal proceeding. Nevertheless, such an argument could be made in good faith. See supra notes
68-106 and accompanying text.
119. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 7.
120. 231 N.C. 491, 57 S.E.2d 763 (1950).
121. Id. at 493, 57 S.E.2d at 765.
122. 66 N.C. App. 537, 311 S.E.2d 889 (1984), aff'd, 314 N.C. 98, 336 S.E.2d 59 (1985). Cauble
involved a class action brought on behalf of the citizens of Asheville to compel the city to pay into
the county school fund all overtime parking fines. Id. at 537, 311 S.E.2d at 890. The central issue
was the definition of the "clear proceeds" of those fines. Before articulating the rule, the Cauble
court also noted that the general assembly has not suggested any guidelines or formula for determin-
ing what costs are deductible in computing clear proceeds. Id. at 541, 311 S.E.2d at 892.
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taken in is that the item to be deductible must bear a reasonable rela-
tion to the costs of collection of the fine.... [A] determination of costs
can be made by qualified accountants, which determination is no more
complicated than other problems accountants are daily accustomed to
resolving. 123
The cost of buying drugs, for example, seems reasonably related to the cost of
obtaining a forfeiture judgment against the dealers of those drugs. Therefore,
law enforcement agencies could then be reimbursed for their investigatory
Costs. 
12 4
The clear proceeds argument, however, has several problems. First, forfei-
ture proceeds may not be used to reimburse an agency in excess of expenses it
incurred during that specific forfeiture action. In Shore v. Edmisten 125 the
North Carolina Supreme Court held that "monies to be set aside for future en-
forcement of the law [could not] be deducted from 'fines' to arrive at 'clear pro-
ceeds.' "126 Given the Shore court's limitation, the general assembly's intention
that all forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement and interstate cooperation
would likely be frustrated. Second, the Cauble line of cases involves penalties
such as parking fines 127 and forfeiture of bond for nonappearance. 128 A court
may distinguish Cauble's clear proceeds rationale on the ground that RICO of-
fenses include more serious crimes to which specific law enforcement expenses
are not readily matched. If those expenses are uncertain, RICO may be beyond
Cauble's scope, and a court might disallow them in calculating clear proceeds.
If the clear proceeds argument fails, the general assembly has a second non-
statutory option to avoid the school fund provision. In its annual budgeting
process, the general assembly could simply allocate less money for education
and more for law enforcement. Law enforcement would have a larger budget
and the loss of general fund money from school budgets would be made up by
123. Id. at 543, 311 S.E.2d at 893-94 (emphasis added).
124. If the State loses in court on the clear proceeds argument, it may pursue the alternative
theory of restitution. The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that "[a] state or a local agency
can be the recipient of restitution where the offense charged results in particular damage or loss to it
over and above its normal operating costs." Shore v. Edmisten, 290 N.C. 628, 633-34, 227 S.E.2d
553, 559 (1976). The Shore court went on to state:
In a prosecution for sale or possession of contraband we hold that it is proper to order
the defendant to reimburse a state or local agency, as a condition for suspension of sentence
or probation, any sum paid by its agents to the defendant in order to obtain evidence of the
crime. Such a payment is not a fine.
Id. at 634, 227 S.E.2d at 559. If the reimbursement is not a fine, it is not subject to article IX, section
7. Id. at 635, 227 S.E.2d at 558-59.
Moreover, the general assembly has recognized restitution in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95.3
(1985). Under that statute, a court may require a person convicted of offenses involving controlled
substances to make restitution to law enforcement agencies for expenditures made in buying con-
trolled substances as evidence of crime. Given this statutory recognition of restitution, a court might
be more willing to extend the theory to the nondrug-related offenses that RICO covers.
125. 290 N.C. 628, 227 S.E.2d 553 (1976). In Shore the Clerk of Superior Court of Guilford
County sought a declaratory judgment to determine the disposition of funds he held as a result of
criminal fines. Id. at 629-30, 227 S.E.2d at 556-57.
126. Id. at 636, 227 S.E.2d at 560.
127. E.g., Cauble, 66 N.C. App. at 537, 311 S.E.2d at 889.
128. E.g., Hightower, 231 N.C. at 491, 57 S.E.2d at 763.
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RICO forfeiture's "clear proceeds." This simple solution, however, has several
practical problems.
First, the amount of the reallocation would be difficult to estimate.
Although RICO forfeiture should produce substantial revenue, the exact sum is
uncertain. 129 As time passes, however, the estimates should improve. Second,
the reallocation could result in an unequal distribution of resources to the coun-
ties. If forfeiture proceeds go to counties in which RICO violations occurred,
but the education budget is cut equally across the counties, those counties with
RICO violations will have a windfall while the others suffer. In essence, coun-
ties with few violations will see their resources redistributed to counties with
many violations. Third, cutting school budgets will not be popular with county
school boards. The school boards will certainly perceive reallocation as a threat
to their funding and oppose it statewide. Fourth, trying to avoid constitutional
provisions may be perceived as wrong, even scandalous, by voters, a result likely
to concern general assembly members. Last, a reallocation of money to law
enforcement agencies will not cure the lack of interstate cooperation. Unless
North Carolina simply gives away money, other states will not share in RICO
forfeiture proceeds. Thus, the second option leaves the general assembly's intent
to have interstate cooperation unfulfilled. The general assembly does not seem
to have a complete solution to the school fund problem.
In addition to the questions of RICO's constitutionality, the statute raises
several practical considerations, particularly those resulting from the general as-
sembly's definition of "racketeering activity." First, this definition is at once too
broad and too narrow. "Racketeering activity" is too broad in the sense that it
covers offenses that seem either trivial or bear no logical relationship to RICO's
stated purpose, which is to attack organized unlawful elements.1 30 The Sovskis'
offense of stealing ginseng from Henry Rockhart is but one of many that should
not be a "racketeering activity." For example, felonies such as the illegal sale of
Jamaica ginger13 1 or the malicious removal of packing from railway coaches
132
bear no rational relation to organized crime. These crimes seem so trivial or
archaic as not to merit felony status, let alone inclusion under RICO. Other
examples include fraudulent entry of horses at fairs 1 3 3 or obtaining a certificate
of registration of animals by false representation.
1 34
Many potentially more serious felonies simply bear no relation to RICO's
purpose. Abortion and related offenses under article 11, for example, are un-
likely to be abused by organized crime. 135 As reprehensible as it may be, rape
also is not an offense properly within RICO's scope. 136 Organized criminals
129. See Raleigh News and Observer, July 12, 1986, at 5C, col. 2.
130. For a discussion of unlawful organized elements, see supra notes 10-15 and accompanying
text.
131. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-389 (1986).
132. Id. § 14-161.
133. Id. § 14-116.
134. Id. § 14-103.
135. Id. §§ 14-44 to -46.
136. Article 7A covers rape and other sexual offenses. Id. §§ 14-27.1 to -27.10.
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may commit terrible crimes, but sexual assault usually is not one of them.
North Carolina's criminal statutes include literally dozens of felonies like these,
all of which should be excluded from the definition of racketeering activity be-
cause they make RICO's scope too broad.
137
At the same time, however, the definition of racketeering activity is too
narrow because the general assembly excluded many offenses, generally misde-
meanors, that are rationally related to organized crime. The general assembly,
for example, excepted all of article 47, which involves cruelty to animals, but
should have kept the article's sections on cock fighting 138 and other animal
fights. 139 As potential gambling activities, both misdemeanor offenses provide
choice opportunities for organized crime. Likewise, gambling 140 and selling
machine guns' 41 are misdemeanors excluded from the definition of racketeering
activity, yet they seem logical offenses to include within RICO's scope. Many
other such crimes arguably belong under RICO. 142
In many instances, moreover, the general assembly's choice of which of-
fenses to include in or except from "racketeering activity" is redundant and even
careless. Most of the, offenses specifically excluded by section 75D-3(c)(1) are
misdemeanors. These crimes presumably are already excluded because they are
not indictable offenses. Examples include marathon dances, 143 public intoxica-
tion,144 injuring bridges,145 and misdemeanor sexual offenses. 146 That the gen-
eral assembly excepted article 43, which involved vagrants and tramps, can only
be characterized as careless, because article 43 already had been repealed. 147
137. Other examples include id. §§ 14-8 to -10 (civil rebellion); §§ 14-11 to -12.1 (subversive
activities); §§ 14-177 to - 202.2 (offenses against public morality and decency); § 14-288.6 (looting
and trespass during emergencies).
The offenses against public morality and decency are troubling. Sections 14-190 and 14-190.4 to
-190.5 cover the production and distribution of pornography, offenses that arguably may be infil-
trated by organized crime. On one hand, these crimes seem natural candidates for RICO sanctions.
On the other hand, RICO provides a great potential for abuse by state officials. For example, police
used Florida's RICO laws to rid Fort Lauderdale of adult bookstores. RICO penalties succeeded
when other tactics failed, including "relentless arrests and heavy police pressure," "rigorous en-
forcement of local ordinances and building codes," and alleged police harassment and intimidation.
Wall St. J., Aug. 18, 1987, § 2, at 35, col. 4. Fort Lauderdale police now have turned their attention
to retail video shops that stock adult films. Id. at 35, col. 6. Its use as a censorship device clearly is
beyond RICO's stated purpose and raises an issue of first amendment freedom. See U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-362 (1986).
139. Id. § 14-362.1.
140. Id. § 14-291.
141. Id. §§ 14-409, -409.9.
142. See, e.g., id. §§ 14-113.1 to -113.7A (fraudulent use of credit cards); § 14-118 (blackmail);
§§ 14-203 to -208 (prostitution); § 14-226 (intimidating or interfering with witnesses); §§ 14-289 to
-291.1 (illegal lotteries).
143. Id. §§ 14-310 to -312.
144. Id. §§ 14-443 to -447.
145. Id. § 14-146.
146. E.g., id. § 14-184 (fornication and adultery); § 14-186 (opposite sexes occupying same hotel
bedroom); § 14-190.9 (indecent exposure). It is unclear why general assembly members went to
such great lengths to ensure that certain offenses, such as fornication and adultery, would not be
RICO violations.
147. See id. §§ 14-336, -338, -339, repealed by Act of Feb. 17, 1983, ch. 17, §§ 1-3, 1983 N.C.
Sess. Laws 11, 11; id. § 14-337, repealed by Act of Mar. 28, 1973, ch. 108, § 13, 1973 N.C. Sess.
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Another problem with RICO's scope is that it unintentionally may include
several misdemeanors. Racketeering activities are acts that would be indictable
if committed with the requisite mental state. 148 Indictable offenses generally in-
clude only felonies. 149 Certain misdemeanors, however, seem to be chargeable
by indictment. For example, section 14-366, which involves molesting livestock,
states that the offense is a misdemeanor but also provides for what must be al-
leged in an indictment. 150 Many misdemeanors include such language.151 The
question arises whether indictable misdemeanors are included in the definition of
racketeering activity. Because the criminal procedure sections which specify
that only felonies are indictable postdate these misdemeanors, their language
arguably supersedes any contrary language in the misdemeanor sections.'
52 If
the general assembly intended only felonies, however, why did it proscribe "acts
which would be chargeable by indictment" instead of "acts chargeable as felo-
nies"? 15 3 At best this language is sloppy lawmaking. At worst it hints that the
general assembly does not always know what it is doing. The language is at least
contradictory and confusing to practitioners and courts.
A final problem with the general assembly's definition ofxacketeering activ-
ity is one of maintenance. The definition is inclusive-that is, the term includes
all of the criminal offenses in chapter 14 of the North Carolina General Statutes
except certain articles and sections.15 4 This inclusiveness means that every time
it amends chapter 14, the general assembly must consider its effect on RICO.
Whenever the general assembly enacts a new felony, the offense will automati-
cally become a racketeering activity, as is the case with computer hacking.' 55
Given the care exhibited in enacting RICO in the first place, it seems unreasona-
ble to expect the general assembly to consider carefully each amendment's effect
on RICO.
Instead, the general assembly should rewrite the definition of racketeering
activity to be exclusive-only those crimes specifically listed would be RICO
offenses. 156 In addition to curing the maintenance problem, defining the term
exclusively would force the general assembly to consider whether each offense is
related to organized crime. The general assembly also should consult state and
federal law enforcement agencies to determine which offenses it should include
in RICO's scope. Furthermore, such close consideration should reduce the re-
dundancy and carelessness apparent in the present definition.
Laws 84, 85; id. § 14-340, repealed by Act of June 30, 1971, ch. 700, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 803,
803; id. § 14-341, repealed by Act of June 30, 1971, ch. 699, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 803, 803.
148. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-3(c)(1) (Interim Supp. 1986).
149. See supra note 18.
150. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-366 (1986).
15 1. E.g., id. § 14-114 (fraudulent disposal of personal property in which another holds a secur-
ity interest); § 14-372 (unauthorized opening, reading, or publishing of sealed letters and telegrams).
152. See supra note 18.
153. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-3(c)(1) (Interim Supp. 1986).
154. Id. § 75D-3(c)(1)b.
155. See id. §§ 14-453 to -457.
156. The United States Congress, for example, wrote the Federal RICO definition of "racketeer-
ing activity" to be exclusive. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (Supp. III 1985).
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A second practical consideration concerns the general assembly's incorpo-
ration of the federal definition of "racketeering activity" into its RICO statute.
By incorporating this definition, North Carolina has incorporated all of the fed-
eral RICO statute's problems as well. Federal RICO has been criticized on a
number of grounds, though most of the criticism has been linked to abuses in
private civil suits.157 In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. I 8 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote:
Given the general purpose of the RICO legislation, the uses to
which private civil RICO has been put have been extraordinary, if not
outrageous. Section 1964(c) has not proved particularly useful for gen-
erating treble damage actions against mobsters by victimized business
people. It has, instead, led to claims against such respected and legiti-
mate "enterprises" as the American Express Company, E.F. Hutton
& Co., Lloyd's of London, Bear Stearns & Co., and Merrill Lynch, to
name a few defendants labeled as "racketeers" in civil RICO claims
resulting in published opinions.' 59
The court of appeals further noted that it has become a "standard practice"'160
to include a RICO claim in tender offer suits, 161 business fraud cases,162 and
other securities 163 and bank fraud litigation.164 A "RICO bar" has developed
that specializes in defending and bringing private RICO suits. 165
The problem with Federal RICO and, by incorporation, North Carolina
RICO, is twofold. First, both statutes provide for treble damages. 166 The barest
possibility of treble damages seems to bring out attorneys with multiple and
questionable claims. Second, under both Federal and North Carolina RICO
statutes a defendant convicted of a crime defined as a racketeering activity is
estopped "as to all matters proved in the criminal proceeding."' 167 Estoppel
makes private RICO actions doubly attractive because the cost of litigation is
reduced and the plaintiff's case is much easier. Because of both treble damages
and estoppel, North Carolina courts, like the federal courts, potentially will be
157. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-8(c) (Interim Supp. 1986) with 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
(1982) (both statutes authorize private actions).
158. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
159. Id. at 487. Even though the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, it agreed that
"[i]nstead of being used against mobsters and organized criminals, [RICO] has become a tool for
everyday [business] fraud cases." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985).
160. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 487.
161. E.g., In re Action Indus. Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Va. 1983).
162. E.g., Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
163. E.g., Trane Co. v. O'Connor Sec., 561 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated as moot, 718 F.2d
26 (2d Cir. 1983).
164. E.g., Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
165. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 486-87.
166. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D.8(c) (Interim Supp.
1986).
167. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-8(e) (Interim Supp. 1986); accord 18 U.S.C. § 1964(d) (1982). An
argument can be made that estoppel makes later civil actions more efficient in that the plaintiff need
not prove a RICO violation for the second time. If conviction equals estoppel, however, a defendant
is more likely to fight at the criminal trial than plea bargain. Efficiencies gained in the civil action
would be offset by the inefficiency of conducting a full criminal trial. Moreover, the costs ofprosecu-
tion are borne by the State; North Carolina will, in effect, pay for part of private plaintiffs' cases.
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inundated by questionable private RICO claims unrelated to the purpose of de-
terring organized crime.
The North Carolina General Assembly, however, was aware of the federal
abuses168 and adopted several preventive measures. Unfortunately, most of
these measures are inadequate. First, Senator Winner stated that RICO's state-
ment of intent makes clear it is not to be used as a weapon in normal business
disputes. 169 The United States Congress, like the North Carolina General As-
sembly, made clear that Federal RICO was to be applied only against organized
crime,1 70 and much debate centered around the potential for malicious harass-
ment of business competitors. 171 Regardless of this intent Federal RICO has
been abused. 172 There is no reason to believe the general assembly's statement
of intent will prevent such abuses in North Carolina.
A second safeguard is that RICO will expire in 1989 unless it is ex-
tended.173 A shortcoming of this safeguard is the great potential for injustice
between RICO's enactment and 1989. Many people could suffer abuses from
State forfeiture actions and unfounded private treble damages suits. With re-
gard to potential abuses, the general assembly should have acted in a preventive
rather than curative manner; RICO should have initially been written to avoid
abuse. For that reason the renewal safeguard is inadequate.
As a third protection, Senator Winner pointed to the RICO provision au-
thorizing the Attorney General to seek a court order blocking the private ac-
tion. 174 The section to which Winner referred, however, only allows a court to
issue a stay of the private action if it finds that the private action will materially
interfere with an ongoing public forfeiture action or that the Attorney General,
because of public interest, should bring a public action. 175 The provision is
designed to prevent a private suit from impairing a public action, not to prevent
baseless private litigation. Even if the provision could be construed to protect
against abuse, the statute provides no procedure by which a private defendant
could appeal to the Attorney General for relief.
The fourth safeguard is the only one that may prevent some abuse,
although it does not go far enough. 176 Section 75D-8(c) provides that for pri-
vate RICO actions, at least one of the racketeering activities complained of must
not be either (1) an act indictable as federal mail or wire fraud or (2) "an offense
involving fraud in the sale of securities." 177 Under this section many of the
168. Raleigh News and Observer, July 12, 1986, at 5C, col. 2.
169. Id.
170. See 116 CONG. REC. 35,191 (1970).
171. H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 58, 187, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWs 4007, 4007.
172. See supra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
173. Act of July 12, 1986, ch. 999, § 3, 1986 N.C. Sess. Laws 360, 372; see Raleigh News and
Observer, July 12, 1986, at 5C, col. 2.
174. Raleigh News and Observer, July 12, 1986, at 5C, col. 2.
175. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-8(c) (Interim Supp. 1986).
176. Interestingly, this safeguard was the only one not mentioned by Representative Winner.
See Raleigh News and Observer, July 12, 1986, at 5C, col. 2.
177. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-8(c) (Interim Supp. 1986).
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abuses noted by the appellate court in Sedima, such as suits for tender offer
fraud,178 are not possible. The general assembly, however, did not prohibit a
private plaintiff from complaining of acts of fraud under North Carolina's crimi-
nal laws. 179 Thus, suits for other types of business fraud may still be abused by
private RICO plaintiffs. The general assembly should have gone much further
toward eliminating this kind of abuse.
In sum, North Carolina RICO has several constitutional and practical
problems. RICO's language purporting to make the statute civil rather than
criminal makes it unconstitutional. In other contexts, forfeiture defendants have
been guaranteed no less constitutional protection than have criminal defendants.
Because RICO forfeiture is in essence a criminal proceeding, it also brings into
question the constitutionality of disposing of forfeiture property to uses other
than county school funds.
The general assembly should cure these constitutional defects with two
amendments. First, the general assembly should statutorily recognize that
RICO is criminal. This amendment is necessary if there is to be any effective
RICO-like law in North Carolina; otherwise, courts surely will hold RICO un-
constitutional. Second, the general assembly should define "clear proceeds" in
the statute itself to include all costs of obtaining forfeiture: investigation, prose-
cution, and administration expenses.' 80 In that way, law enforcement agencies
may be reimbursed for some of their operating expenses. Under this amend-
ment, however, other states would not be able to share in North Carolina forfei-
ture proceeds, thus potentially impairing interstate cooperation. Apart from a
constitutional amendment, little can be done about the school fund problem.
Fortunately, RICO's practical problems are less difficult to solve. The gen-
eral assembly needs to make several amendments to the definition of "racketeer-
ing activity." First, section 75D-3(c)(1)b, which defines racketeering activity by
reference to North Carolina's criminal statutes, should be made exclusive. 181
Defining racketeering activity by specific criminal offenses will prevent RICO
from becoming broader or narrower in scope each time the general assembly
amends the criminal laws. Further, an exclusive definition will force the general
assembly to examine each offense to determine whether it is related to organized
crime. The resulting definition of RICO should be more cohesive and less
redundant.
The general assembly also will need to prevent potential abuses by private
RICO plaintiffs. The most obvious change is to eliminate treble damages; they
are not necessary to compensate victims of organized crime, and their presence
only invites abuse.182 A second amendment should disallow the use of estoppel
178. See supra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
179. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-100 to -118.5 (1986).
180. The Cauble court implied that a statutory definition of clear proceeds would be permissible,
even desirable. Cauble v. City of Asheville, 66 N.C. App. 537, 540-41, 311 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1984),
aff'd, 314 N.C. 598, 336 S.E.2d 59 (1985); see supra note 122.
181. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
182. Of course, eliminating treble damages also eliminates RICO's punitive effect. A RICO de-
fendant only will forfeit illegal profits and repay injuries, but will not suffer a greater loss simply as
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by civil plaintiffs against criminally convicted defendants. Although it makes
private suits more efficient, estoppel makes criminal proceedings inefficient'
8 3
and attracts questionable claims. Instead of estoppel, the general assembly
should specifically allow for a lower burden of proof in private actions, such as a
preponderance of the evidence. The general assembly should also require a pri-
vate plaintiff to show some connection between a defendant and organized crimi-
nal activity. 184 Although these amendments would make a plaintiff's case more
difficult, the positive effect is that baseless suits would be discouraged.
Regardless of RICO's problems, the statute arose from a host of good inten-
tions-deterring organized crime, preventing unjust enrichment, and compen-
sating victims. Attacking crime by taking out its profit is a good weapon against
criminals. North Carolina RICO fails, however, in translating this concept into
statutory language. The suggested amendments to RICO should help direct it
back toward its goals. These amendments, however, are just a beginning. They
cure RICO's major defects, but other problems are sure to arise as RICO is
litigated. If the general assembly follows RICO's development closely, making
changes when necessary, and if courts interpret the statute to give effect to its
purpose, RICO will deter organized crime and compensate its victims.
JOSEPH ROBERT THORNTON
punishment. The general assembly must weigh the need for punishment against the potential for
abuse. As an alternative, however, the general assembly could impose heavy fines on RICO forfei-
ture defendants. Because a RICO violation would already be classified as a crime through amend-
ment, assessing fines would pose no more procedural or constitutional difficulty.
183. See supra note 167.
184. Some authorities have even suggested restricting the private cause of action to cases in
which a defendant has been criminally convicted. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d at 498-
99. This restriction, however, would leave victims compensated only when the State chooses to
prosecute. Further, the restriction would eliminate a plaintiff's usefulness as a "[p]rivate attorney
general." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985).
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